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Article
The Epic of Gilgamesh attempts to answer the question of 
how, given the finality of death, one might find happiness, 
meaning, and value in this life. Many commentators argue 
that the text provides two separate, although ultimately 
unsatisfactory, alternatives.
The first is fame—if I build lasting monuments or per-
form heroic acts, I can live forever in the memories of others. 
Early in the Epic, we see this solution in the building of the 
walls of Uruk and in the slaying of Humbaba. Yet, with the 
death of his dear friend, Enkidu, Gilgamesh concludes that 
fame is ultimately empty. He wants his friend back. Even 
more, he fears his own demise. So he journeys to the end of 
the Earth to find the two humans who have been granted 
immortality by the gods. Once there, he discovers that theirs 
was a unique circumstance that he could not hope to repeat.
Gilgamesh also receives a second answer to finding mean-
ing and happiness in this life. He is told to eat, drink, and be 
merry. Love your wife, hold your children close, be satisfied 
with the simple joys of living. As Gilgamesh’s culture did not 
believe in a robust afterlife, this was the best to which one 
could aspire. Gilgamesh, at last resigned to his mortality, 
accepts his role as ruler and shepherd for his subjects.
Why Seek an Alternative? Using 
Levinas to Understand the Epic
What is troubling about this interpretation is that these “solu-
tions” are so easily dismissed. For our culture, wherein many 
believe that this life only has meaning in the context of some 
ultimate, eternal afterlife, such a dismissal makes sense. 
Even those who do not share a belief in an afterlife may tend 
toward the assumption that “primitive” cultures have little to 
teach us in this regard. Taken in terms of the Epic’s culture, 
were these solutions really so inadequate? Why did this story 
endure? One characteristic of great literature is that it speaks 
to human experience in a multitude of ways. It is possible 
that the story is intended to reflect upon the many ways in 
which nature does not, ultimately, satisfy human desires. But 
it seems facile to use this to dismiss the possibility of a richer 
reading of the solutions proposed by the Epic. Looking 
deeper, we may find resources on par with, even richer than, 
some of our modern ways of addressing these questions.
It is not that the solutions offered here are absent from the 
literature. It is just that many commentators believe, as does 
Kramer, that “none of [them] holds any real promise” 
(Kramer, 1988, p. 100). Even George, one of the Epic’s great 
scholars, appears to discount what may prove to be a key 
moment in the Epic—downplaying shifts in the death of 
Enkidu and explaining care for one’s subjects as “duty” to the 
gods (George, 1999, p. xxxvii; 2003, p. 504). But although 
George may at times fall prey to this tendency, for the most 
part, he rises above it. George is exactly right when he notes 
that the Epic has often been understood as a “vehicle for 
reflection on the human condition” (George, 2003, p. 527). 
Gilgamesh endured as an Epic because it spoke, on multiple 
levels, to the lives of the people who created it.1
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Abstract
The Epic of Gilgamesh attempts to answer the question of how, given the finality of death, one might find meaning and happiness 
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Part of the reason these solutions are so easily discounted 
may be that they are usually understood as isolated, static cate-
gories. But just as Gilgamesh undergoes a process of transfor-
mation throughout the Epic, so, too, do these two solutions. By 
the end of the Epic, they may well become aspects of a single, 
transformed solution, one that is richer in its implications for 
human life and happiness than our current reading. Such a trans-
formation can only be understood if we moderate at least two 
fairly common assumptions. First is the modern assumption that 
all human behavior can be understood as some form of egoism 
or self-interest. Second is the assumption that this life can only 
have meaning in terms of an infinite continuation of the self. 
Levinas, operating out of both the Greek and Hebrew traditions, 
can help us to see that these are not the only alternatives.
Why Levinas? First, Levinas operates out of the Hebrew 
tradition, which is not only from the same part of the world as 
the Epic, but may also have shared a common source with 
Ecclesiastes. This suggests that there may have been similari-
ties between aspects of these traditions. In fact, a crucial pas-
sage of the Epic for making the link to Levinas’s thought is 
one that closely parallels a passage in Ecclesiastes. Second, as 
a phenomenologist, Levinas focuses on those basic experi-
ences that define us as human. This is consistent with the pos-
sibility that the Epic is meant to describe basic aspects of our 
human condition. Specifically, Levinas argues that at the heart 
of our humanity is the recognition of a powerful, yet fragile, 
pre-intellectual experience of care. This is an experiential 
claim. If accurate, this affective call to care—particularly for 
those who are most vulnerable—lies at the heart of both ethics 
and the development of everything we think of as human. This 
includes the capacities of speech, reason, freedom, self, moral-
ity, and even particular forms of violence.2 While this experi-
ence is pre-rational, if Levinas is correct, some form of this 
experience should be found in every culture.
For example, it has been argued that this call, while not 
fully articulated, surfaced in Greek medicine, underlying 
important aspects of the Hippocratic Oath (Degnin, 2007). In 
Gilgamesh, its implications are even more radical.
1. First, it provides a new way of viewing the solution 
of the Epic: that the meaning of life and happiness are 
found, not primarily in intellectual beliefs, but within 
rich, emotional, and embodied relationships of care.
2. Second, if accurate, this suggests that an excessive 
focus on individual afterlife can, at times, be a prod-
uct of intellectual abstraction, born of an attempt to 
replace real, relational connections in a desperate bid 
for certainty.3
Regardless of the actual status of an afterlife, an excessive 
dependence on such beliefs, far from being a realistic source 
of meaning in this life, might actually serve to undermine it. 
It might also undermine any reasonable and compassionate 
ethics. One need only consider the many atrocities, both his-
torical and modern, that have been justified to earn 
said afterlife. In fact, some studies suggest that non-religious 
people may in fact be more motivated by compassion than 
those who profess to be religious.4 What Gilgamesh learns, 
and can teach us, is that the meaning of life, and the source of 
ethics, can be found right here, in the call to care.
This also ties to a second reason why Levinas is particu-
larly useful in re-reading the Epic. As both a student of 
Heidegger and of Judaism, Levinas provides both a power-
ful critique of aspects of Western philosophy and a bridge 
between insights of his Jewish heritage with Western 
thought. This bridge is particularly suggestive in terms of 
the Epic. Not only were the Hebrews neighbors to the cul-
tures that spawned the Epic, there is evidence that Hebrew 
scriptures shared common textural resources with the 
Epic—particularly the flood narrative and Ecclesiastes 
(Jones, 1990). Finally, there was a similar worldview in 
terms of an afterlife. Early Judaism, as with some sects 
today, found meaning and value in life without recourse to 
an afterlife. Understanding this worldview could provide a 
resource for understanding this aspect of the Epic. But for 
this, we need to turn to the text of the Epic.
Reading the Text
Consider the attitude of the Epic toward human mortality:
As for man, [his days] are numbered,
whatever he may do, it is but the wind,
. . . exists not for me . . . (George, 1999, p. 19 [text lost])
George then compares this with a text from Ecclesiastes 
3:19-20:
. . . as one does, so dies the other.
They all have the same breath.
. . . all is vanity . . .
. . . all are from dust, and all turn to dust again.
Both focus on the ephemeral nature of human life, we are 
but breath or wind. But if this is so, what gives one meaning 
and value in life? In the beginning, the Epic suggests fame, 
either by great works or heroic deeds. Gilgamesh does both, 
beginning with the great wall and temples of the city:
Climb Uruk’s wall and walk back and forth
Survey its foundations, examine the brickwork!
Were its bricks not fired in an oven?
Did the Seven Sages not lay its foundations? (George, 1999, p. 2)
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As long as the city endures, so, too, would the memory of 
its builder. To ensure this, Gilgamesh had the story of his life 
and deeds inscribed on the wall. But this was not enough. 
Gilgamesh’s desire for the second sort of fame guided his 
decision to kill the protector of the forest:
I will conquer him in the Forest of Cedar:
let the land learn Uruk’s offshoot is mighty!
Let me start out, I will cut down the cedar,
I will establish for ever a name eternal! (George, 1999, p. 20)
Early in the Epic, Gilgamesh’s focus was on his own 
needs. Due to his great strength and endurance, he terrorizes 
his own people, exhausting the men in games and demanding 
the right to sleep with brides on their wedding nights:
The young men of Uruk he harries without warrant,
Gilgamesh lets no son go free to his father,
By day and night his Tyranny grows harsher . . . (George, 1999, 
p. 3)
. . . lets no girl go free to her bride [groom] . . . (George, 1999, p. 4)
Because none could stand against Gilgamesh, Enkidu was 
created in response to the pleas of the people. He was 
intended to become friend and companion to Gilgamesh, to 
provide a healthier outlet to Gilgamesh’s “enthusiasm” and 
to teach Gilgamesh to care. Enkidu begins more as wild beast 
than man, of strength comparable to Gilgamesh, but of a sub-
stantially different temperament. Whereas Gilgamesh was 
like a spoiled child, caring only for himself, Enkidu began as 
a caretaker for the other beasts, springing them from hunter’s 
traps and protecting them from harm. Enkidu exhibited a 
natural compassion that was, in the beginning, merely latent 
in Gilgamesh. Seduced and civilized by the temple priestess 
Shamhat, Enkidu loses the trust of the wild beasts but gains 
the benefits of civilization. He becomes Gilgamesh’s close 
companion.
But first, Enkidu challenges Gilgamesh. In part, 
Enkidu’s challenge to Gilgamesh was that of any alpha 
male asserting dominance. But from the text, we see that 
there is more. Upon arriving in Uruk, he is told that 
Gilgamesh is about to claim “first night,” the right to sleep 
with a new bride before her groom. George’s claim that 
Enkidu’s “face paled in anger” (George, 1999, p. 15) sug-
gests that Enkidu was not motivated only by the desire to 
show dominance, but by a sense of moral outrage. But 
even without that claim, the fact is that his first act upon 
arriving in Uruk, one of compassion for the vulnerable, 
was to stand between Gilgamesh and the bride Gilgamesh 
intended to despoil.
For the goddess of weddings was ready the bed,
for Gilgamesh, like a god, was set up a substitute.
Enkidu with his foot blocked the door of the wedding house,
not allowing Gilgamesh to enter.
They seized at the door of the wedding house,
in the street they joined combat . . . (George, 1999, p. 16)
In the battle that followed, Gilgamesh prevailed, but only 
just. Meeting for the first time someone who could stand 
against him, he found someone he could love and respect. 
They became fast friends.
The arrival of Enkidu can be seen as a relief to the citizens 
of Uruk in at least two ways. First, by providing a companion 
and equal to Gilgamesh, he distracts Gilgamesh from seek-
ing to entertain himself at the expense of his people. But 
there is much more. The arrival of Enkidu began a process of 
transformation on the part of Gilgamesh. Just as children 
need boundaries in order to learn to care, so, too, Gilgamesh 
needed an equal to help set those boundaries.5 Gilgamesh, 
for all his power, was bored—he abused his own people in a 
vain attempt to entertain himself.
The gods divine with remarkable insight what is at the root of 
the trouble: Gilgamesh’s superior energy and strength set him 
apart and make him lonely. He needs a friend, someone who 
measures up to him and can give him companionship on his own 
extraordinary level of potential and aspiration. (Jacobson, 
1976/2001)
Thus, Enkidu, while submitting to Gilgamesh, won the 
battle in two crucial ways. First, he won the respect and love 
of Gilgamesh. Second, we never hear again that Gilgamesh 
sought the right of first night. Enkidu succeeded in his 
defense of the vulnerable.
The defense of the vulnerable, the capacity to care, is, for 
Levinas, the key humanizing trait. In this sense, Enkidu, 
even in his beast-like state, began the Epic the more human 
of the two. Levinas argues that it is precisely the inversion of 
normal power relationships, this strange capacity of the vul-
nerable to evoke the power of compassion, that is at the heart 
of all we characterize as human. The experience is fragile 
and pre-rational. Fragile because it does not always happen, 
fragile, too, because it is easily swept aside. This differs from 
self-interest—enlightened or not—in that the focus of self-
interest is the ego, the needs of the person. Levinas speaks to 
a capacity to set those needs aside, to place oneself in service 
to another. He calls this counter impulse desire (Levinas, 
1969, p. 117). Sometimes, it is just a moment: I see another 
person or creature in pain, and for an instant, I forget myself, 
feeling only a desire to relieve that suffering. It is not that 
one’s own needs are unimportant. In fact, as Levinas writes, 
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only a being who can eat can know what it is like for another 
to go hungry, only a being that can feel pleasure and pain can 
care (Levinas, 1981, p. 74). It is rather that, to become fully 
human, the needs of the one must be balanced, and at times 
subordinated, by care for others. To be clear:
Needs: Are robust and basic to us all. They point “inward” to the 
person, to caring for oneself, to the satisfaction of basic human 
“needs” (food, shelter, etc.)
Desire: Is more fragile, in the sense that it is more easily “lost” 
or overwhelmed by needs. Desire points outwards, toward 
caring for and serving others. However, if nurtured, it can 
become strong enough to even overcome basic needs.
It should be emphasized that, without need, there might be no 
desire. One must be able to experience needs (and their satisfac-
tion) not just to understand another’s specific needs, but even to 
understand the concept of need. In a “perfect” world, where there 
were no needs, there would also be no space for compassion.
Understood in these terms, Gilgamesh won more than a 
physical battle. Through Enkidu, Gilgamesh first experi-
enced limits, even pain, and gained a companion he respected 
and loved. This began a process by which he would, in 
stages, learn to live beyond his own selfishness. Gilgamesh 
was now vulnerable. But he was also no longer bored.
To clarify how this changes the Epic’s answer to meaning 
in life, it helps to jump ahead to the second solution. Here, 
Gilgamesh, despondent after the death of Enkidu, is seeking 
the help of the one person who escaped mortality. In an older 
version of the story, he receives the following advice from 
Shiduri, the goddess/alewife:
But you, Gilgamesh, let your belly be full,
Enjoy yourself always by day and by night,
Make merry each day
Dance and play day and night!
Let your clothes be clean,
let your head be washed, may you bath in water!
Gaze on the child who holds your hand,
Let your wife enjoy your repeated embrace! (George, 1999, 
p. xxxvi)
George notes the close parallel to Ecclesiastes 9:7-9:
Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy,
and drink thy wine with a merry heart . . .
let thy garments be always white, . . .
live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest . . . (George, 1999, 
p. xxxvi)
It is passages such as these that suggest a common origin 
for both texts. Both begin with eating and drinking, taking 
joy in life’s simple pleasures, wearing clean garments, and 
end with loving one’s family. But it seems to me that the real 
import of these passages has been discounted. It is easy for 
those in our culture to notice the “eat, drink, and be merry” 
message. This parallels our notion of self-interest and 
Levinas’s notion of the value and motivation of need. Such 
an interpretation is characteristic of Gilgamesh’s behavior at 
the start of the Epic. Yet it is important to notice that, even 
prior to receiving this advice, the Epic had already declared 
the inadequacy of said interpretation. Why then bring it up? 
Perhaps the lack is not in the “solution,” but in Gilgamesh’s, 
and our, understanding.
Because our culture focuses primarily upon self-interest, 
we tend to read both parts of Shiduri’s advice in terms of 
self-interest. But that is not necessarily the case in either 
Shiduri’s speech or the passage from Ecclesiastes. It is pos-
sible that these passages address both aspects (need and 
desire) of human experience.
Need is addressed in the exhortation to eat, drink, and be 
merry.
Desire is addressed in the exhortation to love one’s wife 
and child.
In addition, even the reference to clean clothing reminds 
one, not of the isolated individual, but of the member of a 
community. For an ancient culture, cleanliness was a sign of 
being part of a greater community. Only those who were part 
of a community typically had the energy to spare from sur-
vival to worry about cleanliness. As part of the community, 
one was expected to care for more than just oneself. Thus, 
Gilgamesh, following the death of Enkidu, wandered the 
wilds clad only in the skin of a lion. This was both where 
Gilgamesh was, in a sense, lost to both himself and to civili-
zation. When he is re-clothed in garments that will not dirty 
until he reaches home (a place where they could be cleaned), 
he is reborn, re-civilized.
If everything in life is reduced to need, human meaning is 
reduced to a search for the service and survival of the ego. 
But if Levinas is correct, that which makes us distinctly 
human is our ability to also care for others—at times, prior 
to and more than for ourselves. In this reading, meaning is 
not found in the preservation of the ego, even if that preser-
vation is into an eternal thereafter, but in the joining of a rich 
life in the giving of oneself to others. The real import of the 
passage is the balance6 between the two parts, the second of 
which Gilgamesh will understand only at the end of his 
journey.
There are few passages more suggestive of this possibility 
than the scene of Enkidu’s death. When Enkidu is told he is 
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going to die, he becomes bitter, cursing all those who led him 
out of the forest to his death. Then the god Shamash speaks 
to Enkidu:
O Enkidu, why curse Shamhat the harlot,
who fed you bread that was fit for a god,
and poured you ale that was fit for a king,
who clothed you in a splendid garment,
and gave you as companion the handsome Gilgamesh?
And now Gilgamesh, your friend and your brother,
[will] lay you out on a magnificent bed,
[On] a bed of honor he will lay you out,
[he will] place you on his left, on a seat of repose,
[the rulers] of the underworld will all kiss your feet.
The people of Uruk [he will have] mourn and lament you,
the [thriving] people he will fill full of woe for you.
After you are gone his hair will be matted in mourning,
[clad] in the skin of lion, he will wander the wild. (George, 1999, 
p. 58-59)
This speech turned Enkidu’s heart, so that his anger was 
stilled, he blessed those whom he has just cursed:
Enkidu heard the words of Shamash the hero,
. . . his heart so angry grew calm,
. . . [his heart] so furious grew calm,
“Come, [Shamhat, I will fix your destiny!]
[My] mouth [that] cursed you shall bless [you] . . .” (George, 
1999, p. 59)
The question is: Why did Enkidu die in peace? Based on 
two readings of the Epic, there appear to be two possibilities. 
In terms of the first reading of the Epic, one might argue that 
Enkidu, having been reassured that his name would live for-
ever, could now rest in knowing that he had achieved the 
only form of immortality possible for mortals: living a rich 
life and having died famous.7 Yet it is precisely with the 
death of Enkidu that Gilgamesh comes explicitly to reject 
both fame and a life of pleasure as adequate solutions to 
happiness. This strongly suggests that these self-centered 
solutions miss the point of the Epic. Instead, following 
Levinas’s notion of desire, it seems to me that Shamash’s 
speech reminded Enkidu of how deeply his friend would suf-
fer upon his death and how much the gifts that they had 
shared meant to them both. It was Enkidu’s love and compas-
sion for others, so characteristic of his life, that mitigated his 
anger and allowed Enkidu to die in peace. Enkidu would live 
on. But it was not for the sake of personal fame, it was for the 
sake of the love he had shared and the positive impact of 
Enkidu’s life upon those whom he had come to love. In this 
way, both “solutions” are transformed. Whereas at the begin-
ning of the Epic, both (fame and living a rich life) are sepa-
rate and self-centered, with Enkidu, they become a single, 
other centered solution, focused on care for one’s loved ones.
This reading finds support in Gilgamesh’s response to 
Enkidu’s death. Gilgamesh’s love for Enkidu opens a door to 
love, but Gilgamesh only came to understand its meaning in 
stages. While his grief was authentic, what made Gilgamesh 
inconsolable was that he was still focused too much on himself:
For his friend Enkidu Gilgamesh
did bitterly weep as he wandered the wild:
“I shall die, and shall I not be as Enkidu?”
Sorrow has entered my heart! (George, 1999. P. 70)
Gilgamesh’s love of Enkidu had rendered him vulnerable to 
pain. But instead of turning that pain toward care and honor for 
others, he turned inward upon himself. He continued to pursue 
life and relationships as acts of aggression, something to be 
dominated and won, and not something calling for engagement 
and a profound surrender of the self for the sake of others. The 
journey that completes the Epic was needed for Gilgamesh to 
complete these lessons. Along the way, he meets various gods, 
goddesses, and their servants, initially discarding their wisdom, 
but also experiencing how his natural aggression acted against 
his goals. For example, his destruction of the “stone” poles8 on 
the Ferryman’s boat, while intended to intimidate the Ferryman 
as a show of power, actually rendered them unable to cross the 
sea (George, 2003, p. 499). So Gilgamesh had to cut new poles 
and find new strategies to assist the Ferryman. When he arrives 
at the home of Uta-napishti, the only human to win eternal life, 
his intent had been to wrestle the secret from him by force. But 
instead of finding a heroic figure, greater than life, he finds an 
ordinary man. And, at this point, he loses his desire to dominate 
Uta-napishti. Gilgamesh is coming to learn prudence—and 
perhaps a bit of humility:
I look at you, Uta-napishti:
your form is no different, you are just like me . . .
I was fully intent on making you fight,
but now in your presence my hand is stayed. (George, 1999, p. 88)
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While at the home of Uta-napishti, he is given and fails 
additional tests, coming even further to grip with his mortal-
ity and his limits. Gilgamesh is disappointed but resigned to 
his fate. And this is where many commentators leave us. But 
while the transformation of the two solutions is not as clean 
as with the death of Enkidu, there are at least four pieces of 
evidence that it occurs.
First, in the prologue to the standard edition, the poet writes: 
“He came a far road, was weary, found peace . . .” (George, 
1999, p. 1)
Second, he is given a garment which will not become soiled 
until he reaches home and is again able to receive clean clothing 
(George, 1999, p. 98). This clothing, replacing the animal pelts 
he had been wearing, serves as a symbol that he has been 
re-civilized (transformed), that he is ready to rejoin the human 
community.
Third, there is the pivotal position of the story of Enkidu’s death 
as the event which launched the journey—still our strongest 
piece of evidence.
Fourth, there is the record of Gilgamesh as becoming a wise and 
beloved ruler following his return.
Of course, the Epic externalizes this fourth item as the will 
of the gods. But rather than simply taking the Epic at its word, 
let us return to the insight that these motifs could be ways of 
expressing inner spiritual and cultural truths. If Levinas is cor-
rect, it is precisely care that forms an internal relationship of 
meaning. In other words, just as the capacity for care precedes 
rationality, so, too, the meaning of life is something that must 
be experienced, it must be felt in the lived connections with oth-
ers.9 Of course, we do not want to die. But an obsessive desire 
for an afterlife, as evidenced by Gilgamesh, is not, in fact, the 
means to happiness. It may, instead, be a path to misery.
At the end of the Epic, Gilgamesh returns home, ready to 
take up his position as ruler. But he is no longer the ruler of 
the beginning of the Epic. He has become a humble, wiser 
man. When he returns with the Ferryman at his side, he takes 
him again to the walls of Uruk:
O Ur-shanabi, climb Uruk’s wall and walk back and forth!
Survey its foundations, examine the brickwork!
Were its bricks not fired in an oven?
Did the Seven Sages not lay its foundations?
A square mile is city, a square mile is date-grove,
a square mile is clay-pit, half a square mile the temple of Ishtar:
three square miles and a half is Uruk’s expanse. (George, 1999, 
p. 99)
The words echo the beginning of the Epic. But has 
Gilgamesh simply resigned himself to the notion that such 
fame is the only immortality available to humankind? Or has 
the meaning of the passage changed? George, even without 
the benefit of Levinas’s thought, names and objects to the 
common view:
It is often supposed that [these lines] reveal in Gilgamesh an 
acceptance that he will make do with the immortal renown 
brought to him by building the city’s wall. That is too specific a 
view. For while the epilogue begins by taking the audience in 
their imagination up on the wall once more, the last two lines 
make it clear that the poet fixes our gaze firmly on what the wall 
encloses . . . (George, 2003, p. 526)
The gaze is fixed, not on the wall itself, but on whom the 
wall shelters. It is no longer primarily about Gilgamesh, but 
about those for whom he cares.
Transforming the Man and the Message
Just as Gilgamesh undergoes a series of transformations, so, 
too, do these “solutions.” Both begin as egocentric 
pursuits—Gilgamesh starts as a tyrant and a hedonist. The 
reason neither fame nor living well is satisfying is because 
both solutions are focused on himself—his ego—not on ser-
vice to others. Through a series of transformations that occur 
throughout the text, Gilgamesh discovers a deeper, richer 
way of life. He discovers the value of care. It is this value, 
this embodied connection, that provides the unifying force 
for the two solutions and that provides, if this reading of the 
Epic is correct, the only authentic means for human satisfac-
tion. Once discovered, Gilgamesh ceases to live primarily 
for his own pleasure. Personal fame, while still desired, loses 
importance. The joy he takes in daily life, the simple plea-
sures and human connections, these become sources of real 
satisfaction. Even living on in the memory of others is trans-
formed from a focus on personal accomplishments to a focus 
on service.
The story ends with him showing the wall to the 
Ferryman—but its meaning and emotional tenor have 
changed. It is no longer primarily about Gilgamesh’s per-
sonal pride, although he still takes pride in and would like to 
be remembered for the accomplishment. Its deeper value, 
that which has become of greater importance to Gilgamesh, 
is how well it shelters his people.
Thus, both “meanings” are transformed:
Seize the Day! (Eat, drink, and be merry)
Is no longer just about personal pleasure, but about the joy 
of caring for one’s family, one’s children, one’s neighbors.
Fame! (Living on in the memory of others through monuments 
or enduring walls)
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Is no longer primarily about his personal fame, but about 
their value in sheltering his people.
Fame! (Living on in the memory of others through great deeds)
Is now about having contributed to their lives and well-
being, not just about personal immortality.
Perhaps another way of thinking about this would be to 
ask the question:
If you had a choice between
1. being “forgotten,” but having made the lives of your 
children and their children richer and happier for 
your passing; or
2. you could be one of the most famous people to ever 
live, so that almost all people would know your 
name, but that this name would be “Hitler,”
which would you choose?
If you would choose to be “forgotten,” but having made 
life better for your loved ones, the Epic speaks to you.
Thus, for the Epic:
“Egoistic” pleasure instead becomes focused on the plea-
sure of service, being part of a community.
“Egoistic” fame shifts from merely leaving a legacy to 
leaving a more specific legacy, a legacy of care.
Which then shifts to a single solution, where
The meaning of life is found, not in living forever (either 
immortality or in an afterlife), but in the concrete rela-
tionships by which we live and give of ourselves in this 
life.
It is not that Gilgamesh does not also seek his own plea-
sure, he still wants to be remembered. But these needs are 
now placed in the larger context of this desire to serve his 
people, to be a wise and kind ruler, rather than a tyrant.
Given that we know so little of the language and culture, 
we cannot be sure that this reading is any more “correct” than 
other readings. As is true of any great literary work, it 
addresses the human condition from a rich variety of ave-
nues. The value of reading the Epic in the light of Levinas’s 
thought is that Levinas offers us evocative ways to approach 
difficult problems in the text, particularly Enkidu’s strange 
change of heart upon his death.
From another angle, this also parallels an insight recorded 
by Kubler-Ross, a pioneer in the study of death and dying:
To rejoice at the opportunity of experiencing each new day is to 
prepare for one’s ultimate acceptance of death. For it is those 
who have not really lived—who have left issues unsettled, 
dreams unfulfilled, hopes shattered, and who have let the real 
things in life (loving and being loved by others, contributing in 
a positive way to other people’s happiness and welfare, finding 
out what things are really you) pass them by—who are most 
reluctant to die. (Kubler-Ross, 1975, p. xi)
I have seen this, along with others, working as hospital 
chaplain. To take the insight a step further, it appears to me, 
and to many with whom I have worked, that it is not one’s 
belief in an afterlife that correlates most strongly with 
whether one goes peacefully into that great beyond. It is 
really the two things named by Kubler-Ross:
First, whether one feels that one has lived a rich and full 
life (seize the day).
Second, whether one is surrounded by those one loves, 
whether one feels as though one has made positive contri-
butions to their lives, and they to yours.10
For those who have listened to the insights of the Epic, 
this “truth” should come as no surprise.
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Notes
 1. There is controversy on this point; some believe that the Epic 
existed primarily in written form for the court and intellec-
tual elite. Although we lack the evidence to be certain, George 
argues in favor of a wider oral tradition (see George, 2003). 
Even if the former were true, it still appears that it would have 
held such a position with the court. Also, it is worth noting that 
the sections on both the flood and the afterlife were not consid-
ered parts of the main body of the Epic, but were side stories. 
Here, we are focused on what is called the “standard” version.
 2. Because there are various schools of thought as to how to read 
Levinas, and because the differences between schools is not 
crucial for this thesis, I have left the more detailed develop-
ment of these themes to other works. Here, I focus mainly 
on themes, such as the distinctions between need and desire, 
which appear as a common denominator to any interpreta-
tion of Levinas’s work. To serve a wider audience, I have also 
avoided the use of most technical language.
 3. Even if one believes in an afterlife, the Epic has much to 
teach us. One thing I suggest to my students is to set aside 
their belief in an afterlife, at least for the first part of my Death 
and Dying course, because facing that fear had a lot to teach 
us. My own experience, which included service as a hospital 
chaplain, suggests that those who use their belief in an afterlife 
to escape their fear are more likely to be dogmatic and judg-
mental. However, the psychology and spirituality of those who 
face that fear, embrace it, and learn from it, are much different, 
whatever their beliefs about an afterlife. Their beliefs are, in 
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important ways, transformed. The Epic can be read as a story 
of facing that fear.
 4. It should be noted that these studies do not prove that religious 
persons are less generous than non-religious persons. For 
example, it could be (as other studies suggest) that religious 
people are more generous as a whole, but have their generosity 
as a lifestyle choice rather than in immediate situations. The 
studies only appear to support the claim that, in these sorts of 
immediate situations, compassion appears to play a larger role 
for non-religious persons. The value of this sort of study is in 
recognizing that generosity and compassion are not exclusive 
to religious people (Saslow et al., 2013).
 5. It is interesting how often the “gods” in these stories act like 
spoiled children. For example, George refers to a passage 
wherein the goddess Ishtar is scorned “like an angry child . . .” 
(George, 2003, p. 474). With so few limits on their power and 
pleasure, they need never grow up. Boundaries may in fact be 
a gift.
 6. By “balance,” I do not mean to infer a symmetry between need 
and desire, as Levinas would emphasize the asymmetry of the 
relationship between the self and other. (That gets into impor-
tant, but very technical distinctions.) In this case, the term is 
merely intended to emphasize that each is of value and has a 
place in our lives.
 7. Foster, for example, refers to the sun god’s “hollow promise 
. . . of a fine funeral,” apparently recognizing the incongru-
ity of the passage without seeing a way to make sense of it 
(Foster, 2001, p. xxii). George offers a couple of possibilities 
for Enkidu’s reversal, such as mirroring society’s ambivalence 
about prostitution or as a commentary on the arbitrariness of 
the destiny of every mortal (George, 2003). None of these 
seem satisfactory.
 8. Or stone crew, depending upon which translation. Either way, 
the intent of the passage appears to remain the same.
 9. This argument would be lacking if it did not include men-
tion of the loss of the plant of rejuvenation. In a sense, this 
was Gilgamesh’s consolation prize. If he found and ate this 
plant, he would not live forever, but he would at least regain 
the youth and vigor lost in this long journey—another indica-
tion of how an obsessive search for immortality achieves its 
opposite (George, 2003). Oddly, upon obtaining the plant, he 
does not eat it right away, allowing time for it to be stolen 
away by a snake. Perhaps he wanted to save it for the old men? 
Perhaps he wanted to test and see if it was poison? We cannot 
really be sure. But, recalling that there are many themes woven 
throughout the Epic, my best guess is that it serves another 
purpose. For example, see George (2003).
10. Again, I’m not making any claims about the existence or non-
existence of an afterlife.
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